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Abstract
The use of separate multisensory signals is often beneficial. A prominent example is the speed-up of
responses to two redundant signals relative to the components, which is known as the redundant sig-
nals effect (RSE). A convenient explanation for the effect is statistical facilitation, which is inherent
in the basic architecture of race models (Raab, 1962, Trans. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 24, 574–590). However,
this class of models has been largely rejected in multisensory research, which we think results from
an ambiguity in definitions and misinterpretations of the influential race model test (Miller, 1982,
Cogn. Psychol. 14, 247–279). To resolve these issues, we here discuss four main items. First, we
clarify definitions and ask how successful models of perceptual decision making can be extended
from uni- to multisensory decisions. Second, we review the race model test and emphasize elements
leading to confusion with its interpretation. Third, we introduce a new approach to study the RSE.
As a major change of direction, our working hypothesis is that the basic race model architecture is
correct even if the race model test seems to suggest otherwise. Based on this approach, we argue that
understanding the variability of responses is the key to understand the RSE. Finally, we highlight the
critical role of model testability to advance research on multisensory decisions. Despite being largely
rejected, it should be recognized that race models, as part of a broader class of parallel decision mod-
els, demonstrate, in fact, a convincing explanatory power in a range of experimental paradigms. To
improve research consistency in the future, we conclude with a short checklist for RSE studies.
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1. Introduction
Different senses are highly beneficial to act in the environment. Each sense in-
creases the number of signals that can be perceived, which makes it less likely
to crash into something unnoticed. Moreover, as different sensory signals com-
plement one another, the environment can be better understood by considering
signals in combination. To realize the combinatorial benefit in the control of
actions, flexible cognitive functions are needed that analyze and interpret the
countless potential combinations of signals according to task demands and/or
subjective goals. What are these cognitive functions and how can they be stud-
ied?
Multisensory research has a long-standing tradition in investigating the
mapping of sensory signals to motor outputs. A classic paradigm is the re-
dundant signals paradigm, which asks participants to respond with the same
motor act in three conditions, each presenting a different combination of sig-
nals (Hershenson, 1962; Kinchla, 1974; Miller, 1982; Todd, 1912). In two
single signal conditions, for example, either an auditory or a visual signal is
presented. In the third condition, which is called redundant signals condition,
both signals are presented. The two signals are ‘redundant’ in the sense that
detection of either signal is sufficient to initiate a correct response. In fact,
a systematic analysis of the task demands shows that the two signals are,
by design of the paradigm, coupled by a logical disjunction (Fig. 1). This
elementary response mapping makes the redundant signals paradigm a very
interesting tool to investigate the cognitive functions that deal with the combi-
natorial aspects of multisensory signals.
Multisensory research has extensively used the redundant signals paradigm
also for the reason that it shows one of the most prominent behavioral benefits
Figure 1. Analysis of the task demands in the redundant signal paradigm using a truth table. As
indicated by the input variables x and y, two distinct signals are either present (1) or absent (0).
The output variable indicates whether a motor response is required (1) or not (0). A response
is required in the redundant signals condition, when both signals are present (top row), and
in either of the single signal conditions, when only one signal is present (middle rows). No
response is required when neither signal is present (bottom row). The resulting truth table is the
truth table of a logical disjunction (OR).
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that can occur with signals from different senses. The typical finding is that
reaction times (RTs) in the redundant signals condition are on average faster
compared to RTs in the two single signal conditions, which is known as the re-
dundant signals effect (RSE; Hershenson, 1962; Kinchla, 1974; Miller, 1982;
Todd, 1912). Interestingly, the RSE has been studied not only with a wide
range of multisensory signals (e.g., Giard and Peronnet, 1999; Hecht et al.,
2008; Martuzzi et al., 2007; Molholm et al., 2002; Murray et al., 2005; Otto
and Mamassian, 2012; Otto et al., 2013; Perez-Bellido et al., 2013; Wuerger et
al., 2012) but also with two signals within one sensory modality (e.g., Feintuch
and Cohen, 2002; Katzner et al., 2006; Koene and Zhaoping, 2007; Krumme-
nacher et al., 2014; Mordkoff and Yantis, 1993; Poom, 2009; Schröter et al.,
2009), with different subject and patient populations (e.g., Brandwein et al.,
2013; Brang et al., 2012; Collignon et al., 2010; Corballis, 1998; Harrar et al.,
2014), and with different response modalities or task instructions (e.g., Blur-
ton et al., 2014; Hughes et al., 1994 — see Note 1). Given this fascinating
diversity of studies, it is evident that there can be processing differences with
redundantly defined signals (e.g., it makes a difference whether one or two sen-
sory modalities are stimulated; Girard et al., 2013). Still, as the basic paradigm
is always the same, a main objective for multisensory research should be to un-
derstand whether or not a common cognitive function contributes to the RSE
as suggested by the analysis of the task demands.
To address the objective, it is critical to appreciate that there is not only
a fascinating diversity in studies on the RSE but also confusion regarding
how to test and interpret the effect. This confusion starts with a broad range
of important methodological details (e.g., handling of fast outliers, random
stimulus presentation procedures, etc.; Gondan and Minakata, 2016) and ex-
tends towards major conceptual issues (e.g., the definition of race models;
Miller, 2016; Otto and Mamassian, 2010). To unravel the conceptual issues,
we address four main aspects in the following. First, we ask how models of
perceptual decision making, which account for responses to a single sensory
signal, can be extended to conditions that include signals in combination. Sec-
ond, we review the so-called race model test (Miller, 1982), which is highly
used to test a specific model of the RSE, and emphasize elements leading to
confusion with the interpretation of test. Third, we introduce a new approach
to study the RSE and argue that understanding the variability of RTs is the
key to understand the RSE. Finally, we highlight the critical role of model
testability to advance research on multisensory decision making.
2. Multisensory Decision Making
The link between sensing and acting is the central topic in research on per-
ceptual decision making (Bogacz, 2007; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren
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et al., 2008). Perceptual decisions are tested by asking participants to perform
a motor act in response to a sensory signal. The task may appear abstract
but applies to many real-life situations, in which a sensory signal is linked to
an action (consider a car driver, who starts driving when a traffic light turns
green). To account for the speed and the accuracy of such responses, research
on perceptual decision making has converged on a fundamental computational
framework that assumes three main processing steps (Bogacz, 2007). First,
neurons tuned to relevant features of the signal provide with their activity
sensory evidence for the signal. Critically, due to the variability in neuronal ac-
tivity, this evidence is subject to noise. To enable accurate decisions, a second
step reduces the impact of noise by accumulating evidence over time. Finally,
a third step checks whether the accumulated evidence has reached a criterion.
If so, a categorical decision is made (the traffic light is green) and a motor re-
sponse is triggered (start driving). The framework has several strong features.
It is optimal in that it has been demonstrated to be the fastest decision maker
for a given level of accuracy (e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006; Wald and Wolfowitz,
1948). It provides direct explanation for many behavioral findings including
the shape of RT distributions (e.g., Reddi et al., 2003) and speed–accuracy
trade-offs (e.g., Bogacz et al., 2010). It is biologically plausible since neu-
rons have been found that increase activity over time similar to the proposed
accumulation of evidence (e.g., Hanes and Schall, 1996; Hanks et al., 2015;
Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). And it has been realized many times ranging
from psychological models of behavior (e.g., Carpenter and Williams, 1995;
Ratcliff, 1978) to biophysically realistic attractor models (e.g., Deco and Rolls,
2006; Wang, 2002). In summary, the accumulation framework has proven to
be very powerful in unisensory decision making.
Turning back to multisensory research, there is a key question to ask here:
How can the perceptual decision making framework be extended to cover mul-
tisensory decisions as tested in the redundant signals paradigm? As a first
hypothesis, evidence for two redundant signals may be accumulated by two
parallel decision units (Fig. 2A). The two units are then coupled by a logic
OR gate that triggers a response. This basic architecture predicts a speed-up
of responses in the redundant compared to the single signal conditions be-
cause a response can be triggered by the faster of the two parallel decision
units, which has been described as statistical facilitation (Raab, 1962). Given
the race-like mechanism, models complying with this basic architecture are
commonly called race models. As an alternative hypothesis, evidence for two
redundant signals may be pooled first. The pooled evidence is then accumu-
lated by a single decision unit that triggers a response (Fig. 2B). This basic
architecture also predicts a speed-up of responses because two signals provide
more sensory evidence than one signal. Consequently, the accumulation of ev-
idence reaches the decision criterion faster in the redundant compared to the
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Figure 2. The key question: How can the perceptual decision making framework be extended
to account for the redundant signals effect? (A) Logical coupling of parallel decisions. Signals
x and y are first processed by two parallel decision units. Categorical decisions made by these
units are then coupled by a logic gate (OR) that triggers a motor response as output. (B) Pooling
of sensory evidence in one decision. Sensory evidence for signals x and y is first pooled ().
The pooled evidence is then accumulated by a single decision unit that triggers the output.
single signal conditions (Miller, 1982). We refer to this class of models with
only one decision unit as pooling models. In summary, there are two com-
peting cognitive architectures that can, in principle, account for the RSE (see
Note 2).
To advance understanding of multisensory decisions, it is a main objective
to test and discriminate between the competing model classes. The discrimi-
nation is very important because analysis of the RSE on this algorithmic level
can — following Marr’s (1982) level of analysis — bridge the gap between
the computational level (as provided by the analysis of the task demands, see
Fig. 1) and the implementational level (as provided by the many striking in-
teractions in multisensory processing on the neuronal level; e.g., Driver and
Noesselt, 2008; Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Stein and Stanford, 2008). At
this point, we like to highlight that the basic race model architecture (Fig. 2A)
is convenient as it perfectly matches the task demands in the redundant sig-
nals paradigm (Fig. 1). Moreover, as we will discuss in the following section,
race models are convenient as they can directly predict the exact distribution
of RTs in the redundant signals condition. Notwithstanding these powerful
features, we have the impression that multisensory research considers race
models often as ‘not interesting’. One reason may be that race models seem
not to fit the rather vague term ‘multisensory integration’, which has been de-
fined as “the neural process by which unisensory signals are combined to form
a new product” (Stein et al., 2010, p. 1719). While pooling models seem to fit
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here very well by suggesting that multisensory signals are merged into a sin-
gle perceptual decision, it may be difficult to see how race models ‘form a
new product’. On the other hand, Stein et al. (2010, p. 1719) further define
multisensory integration operationally “as a multisensory response (neural or
behavioral) that is significantly different from the responses evoked by the
modality-specific component stimuli”. Remarkably, race models are integra-
tion models according to this definition as they predict faster mean RTs to
redundant signals relative to the components. Still, due to the semantic con-
fusion around the term multisensory integration, we have the impression that
RSE studies are often guided by the belief that race models need to be rejected
in order to demonstrate ‘true multisensory integration’. These issues should
be kept in mind when we review next how the discrimination between the two
model classes has been approached in the past.
3. Testing Race Models
As discussed in the previous paragraph, a strong feature of race models is that
these allow directly for RSE predictions on the level of RT distributions. In a
milestone contribution, Miller (1982) used this feature to develop a very in-
fluential hypothesis test, which since then is routinely used in multisensory
research to check whether or not race models can explain the RSE. Unfortu-
nately, however, for reasons that are difficult to trace back, the test has not
always been used consistently. To avoid confusion in the future, it is there-
fore very important to be clear about how the test works before discussing the
conclusions that can be drawn from it.
3.1. How Does Miller’s Test Work?
The test builds on the basic idea by Raab (1962), who hypothesized that the
RSE can be explained by statistical facilitation, which is inherent in the basic
architecture of race models (Fig. 2A). To formalize statistical facilitation, it is
convenient to describe the time by which a decision unit reaches its criterion to
trigger a response by a random variable. Let Tx be such a random variable to
describe the decision time at which signal x is detected by one unit. Likewise,
let Ty be a random variable to describe the time at which signal y is detected
by the other unit. Assuming a race model, a response to redundant signals can
be triggered by the faster unit to reach its criterion. The corresponding random
variable Tx∪y is given by
Tx∪y = min(Tx, Ty) (1)
where the equal sign denotes equal in distribution. If the probability density
functions of Tx and Ty overlap, the framework predicts that responses to re-
dundant signals are on average faster than responses to either of the single
signals.
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Figure 3. Probability summation illustrated by Venn diagrams. Two sets of events (denoted X
and Y ) are represented by circles. The area covered by both sets together is called the union of
X and Y (denoted X ∪ Y ). It is given by the sum of the areas covered by each individual set
minus the area in which the sets overlap, which is called the intersection of X and Y (denoted
by X ∩ Y ). The illustration corresponds to equation (2).
To check if statistical facilitation can explain the RSE, Miller (1982) de-
rived a testable prediction using probability summation (for an illustration, see
Fig. 3). Let Pxy(Tx  t) be the cumulative probability that a response to sig-
nal x has been triggered at time t on presentation of both signals (the latter
is indicated by the subscript xy). Likewise, let Pxy(Ty  t) be the cumulative
probability that a response to signal y has been triggered. Then, the cumulative
probability Pxy(Tx∪y  t) that one or the other response has been triggered can
be computed by the sum of the probabilities of the individual responses to have
been triggered minus the joint probability Pxy(Tx∩y  t) that both responses
have been triggered
Pxy(Tx∪y  t) = Pxy(Tx  t) + Pxy(Ty  t) − Pxy(Tx∩y  t). (2)
The probability summation rule allows for an exact prediction of decision
times in the redundant signals condition if the RSE is explained by a race
model. Unfortunately, the right-hand side of this equation contains two un-
knowns, which need to be considered to derive a testable prediction.
The first unknown concerns the joint probability Pxy(Tx∩y  t) that both
channels have been triggered, which is contingent on a potential dependence
between Tx and Ty . If the two random variables are statistically independent
(i.e., if a response to one signal makes it neither more nor less likely to observe
a response to the other signal), the joint probability is given by the product of
the individual probabilities. Hence, under the assumption of statistical inde-
pendence, equation (2) can be changed to
Pxy(Tx∪y  t) = Pxy(Tx  t) + Pxy(Ty  t)
− Pxy(Tx  t) × Pxy(Ty  t). (3)
However, as we are going to see below, the two random variables may be
statistically dependent. In case of a positive correlation between the random
variables, observing a fast response to one signal would make it more likely to
also observe a fast response to the other signal. Conversely, in case of a neg-
ative correlation, observing a fast response to one signal would make it more
likely to observe a slow response to the other signal. Critically, a potential cor-
relation has a major effect on statistical facilitation. To solve the issue of the
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unknown joint probability, Miller (1982) used a simple but elegant trick. He
noted that the joint probability, as all probabilities, has to be positive. If the
joint probability is removed from equation (2), the only thing that can happen
is that the right-hand side of the equation becomes larger. Consequently, the
unchanged left-hand side has to be equal to or smaller than the right-hand side,
which is expressed by
Pxy(Tx∪y  t) Pxy(Tx  t) + Pxy(Ty  t). (4)
It is interesting to note that this inequality is an instance of Boole’s inequality,
which states that the probability to observe at least one event of a countable set
cannot be greater than the sum of the probabilities of the individual events. It
is also interesting to note that the right-hand side corresponds to the prediction
in case of a maximal negative correlation, for which the expected statistical fa-
cilitation is largest (Colonius, 1990). In summary, inequality (4) puts an upper
limit on statistical facilitation which is independent of a potential correlation.
The second unknown concerns the cumulative probabilities to observe a
response to one signal when both signals are presented in the redundant
signals condition, which are given by Pxy(Tx  t) and Pxy(Ty  t). Unfor-
tunately, these probabilities are not directly measured in the redundant sig-
nals paradigm. What is measured are the probabilities to observe responses
in the single signal conditions, which can be expressed by Px(Tx  t) and
Py(Ty  t). Although it is unknown whether or not these probabilities are the
same, Miller (1982) implicitly assumed that these are identical
Px(Tx  t) = Pxy(Tx  t),
Py(Ty  t) = Pxy(Ty  t). (5)
This auxiliary context invariance assumption has been made explicit only after
the advent of the test (Ashby and Townsend, 1986; Luce, 1986). The assump-
tion is also known as context independence (Colonius, 1990) but to avoid
confusion with statistical independence, we here use the same terminology
as Townsend and Wenger (2004). Assuming context invariance, inequality (4)
can be changed to
Pxy(Tx∪y  t) Px(Tx  t) + Py(Ty  t). (6)
This so-called race model inequality (or Miller’s bound) can then be used
to test race models (Miller, 1982; Ulrich et al., 2007). If decision times are
equated with RTs (which is another auxiliary assumption, see Gondan and
Minakata, 2016; Luce, 1986), a handy feature of the race model inequality
is that it relates RTs measured with redundant signals to RTs measured with
single signals. For each time t , the left-side of inequality (6) is given by the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) empirically determined in the redundant
signals condition. The right-side is given by the sum of the empirical CDFs
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determined in the single signal conditions. Then, the two sides just need to
be compared. To use Miller’s (1982, p. 253) words, “the important feature of
[inequality (6)] is that it puts an upper limit on the facilitation produced by
redundant signals, and no race model is consistent with a reversal of the in-
equality for any value t”. Hence, if the race model inequality is violated, the
test seems to suggest that all race models can be rejected.
3.2. Interpreting Miller’s Test
Miller (1982) race model test is a beautiful example of hypothesis testing in
scientific enquiry. Consequently, it is no surprise that the race model test is fre-
quently used in multisensory research and has become a ‘standard testing tool’
(Colonius and Diederich, 2006, p. 148). Unfortunately, the redundant signals
paradigm and the race model test have not always been applied consistently
(Gondan and Minakata, 2016). One exemplary issue is that the independent
race model prediction (equation (3)) is frequently mistaken as the race model
inequality (inequality (6)). A far more critical issue is that the race model test
is easily misunderstood in that it could provide an answer to the key question
regarding the basic cognitive architecture (Fig. 2; Otto and Mamassian, 2010).
In fact, it cannot. The race model test is mute about how the perceptual de-
cision making framework is extended to multisensory decisions and provides
no evidence whether the cognitive architecture involves one or two decision
units.
To understand this critical issue, it is important to consider the role of aux-
iliary assumptions in hypothesis testing (Hempel, 1966). How can the race
model test be used to build a valid argument? As a first scenario, the argument
starts with the hypothesis (H) that the RSE can be explained by a basic cogni-
tive architecture assuming two parallel decision units as part of a race model
that produces statistical facilitation (equation (1)). As an implication (I) of this
hypothesis, Miller (1982) derived the race model inequality (inequality (6)).
The two are linked by a conditional statement: If the hypothesis is true, then
so is the implication. Interestingly, empirical evidence denies the implication:
There is strong evidence that the race model inequality is violated in the re-
dundant signals paradigm. Consequently, the hypothesis cannot be true, which
results in the statement that the basic cognitive architecture of race models can
be ruled out. The scenario looks like a valid deductive argument, known as the
modus Tollens (denying the consequent — see Note 3), in which two premises
lead to a conclusion
If H is true, then so is I.
But, as evidence shows, I is not true.
H is not true. (7)
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To be clear, this scenario’s argument is a fallacy. The reason is that the first
premise, the conditional statement, is wrong: The argument does not acknowl-
edge the role of the context invariance assumption, which states that process-
ing of one signal is not changed whether or not the other signal is presented
(equation (5)). As shown in the previous section, context invariance is an auxil-
iary assumption (A) that is critically needed to reach the implication. A second
scenario can account for the role of the auxiliary assumption by changing the
conditional statement: If the hypothesis and the auxiliary assumption are true,
then so is the implication. Although the empirical evidence stays of course
the same, the new conditional statement changes the argument profoundly. It
is no longer valid to conclude that the hypothesis is not true. It can only be
concluded that the hypothesis and the auxiliary assumption are not both true
If H and A are true, then so is I.
But, as evidence shows, I is not true.
H and A are not both true. (8)
It follows that a violation of the race model inequality does not rule out all
race models. A valid alternative is that the basic architecture of race models
(Fig. 2A) is still correct but the auxiliary assumption of context invariance is
wrong. Unfortunately, context invariance is not mentioned by most studies that
have used the test, which has led to confusion about how to interpret the test
(Otto and Mamassian, 2010).
Another source of confusion regarding the test may result from the defini-
tion of concepts, and here the devil is in the detail. We define race models as
models that build on the basic architecture of parallel decision units that are
coupled by a logic OR gate (Fig. 2A). Raab’s (1962) model is a pure version
of this model class as it assumes statistical independence and context invari-
ance. However, there is disagreement regarding the definition of race models
(Miller, 2016). Where exactly is this disagreement coming from and how can
it be resolved? Originally, Miller (1982) framed the race model test as a test of
separate activation, which he uses synonymously with race models and which
he distinguishes from coactivation. Do these two concepts correspond to what
we have specified as a key question for multisensory research (Fig. 2)? For
example, is coactivation the same as what we have introduced as pooling of
sensory evidence in one decision unit? When Miller (1982, p. 248) defined the
term, he stated that “it is convenient to characterize [coactivation] models as
allowing activation from different channels to combine in satisfying a single
criterion for response initiation”. Particularly the final part may suggest that
coactivation is the same as pooling, which may be the reason that pooling is
often depicted as a characteristic feature of coactivation models (e.g., Mord-
koff and Yantis, 1991, their Fig. 1; Townsend and Wenger, 2004, their Fig. 4).
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However, it is critical to understand that the definition is much broader. In fact,
as the issue of context invariance was not considered in the original definition
(Ashby and Townsend, 1986; Luce, 1986), it is very helpful that Miller (2016)
clarified that the term coactivation should include any violation of the context
invariance assumption (which could be anything including for example atten-
tional effects). The clarification in turn implies that a model, which uses a logic
OR coupling of parallel decision units but that also allows for some sort of in-
teraction other than a potential correlation, is not a race model according to
Miller (2016). The clarified definition saves the claim that all race models can
be rejected if the race model inequality is violated, but it is unfortunately not
fitting with what we think is the key question (i.e., does the cognitive architec-
ture involve a single or two parallel decision units? See Fig. 2). Moreover, the
clarified definition seems arbitrary to us as it allows for one sort of interaction
(a potential correlation; see the first unknown in equation (2)) but not for an-
other (a violation of context invariance; see the second unknown in equation
(2)). We therefore keep our definition of race models. If the aim is however
to resolve disagreement, it is probably best to say that Raab’s (1962) simple
race model alone cannot explain the RSE as some sort of interaction must have
taken place. Critically, this interaction is not necessarily a pooling of sensory
evidence within a single decision unit (Fig. 2B) as an explanation of the RSE
may still involve parallel decision units that are coupled by a logic OR gate
(Fig. 2A).
4. Variability Is the Key
The review of the race model test made clear that research on the RSE has
provided so far no evidence that allows rejecting all race models. Quite the
contrary, we like to recap that the basic architecture of race models has two
very strong features. First, it is convenient as it perfectly matches the task
demands in the redundant signals paradigm (Fig. 1). Second, it is convenient
as it can provide direct explanation for the RSE at the level of RT distributions
(equation (2)). These aspects provide sufficient justification to approach the
RSE with the working hypothesis that the basic race model architecture is
correct (even if the race model test has been interpreted to suggest otherwise).
What is more, this new approach to the RSE may provide a very interesting
tool to study possible interactions in the processing of multisensory signals.
Specifically, given that equation (2) can predict the RSE at the level of RT
distributions, it seems feasible to reveal and quantify possible interactions by
analysing the two unknowns of the equation. The approach results therefore
in two questions: firstly ‘Are RTs statistically independent?’ and secondly ‘Is
context invariance true?’. When describing the approach in the following, it
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will become clear that studying sources of variability is the key to understand
the RSE.
Before starting, it is helpful to consider the stochastic nature of RTs (Luce,
1986). As introduced with the race model test, it is convenient to summa-
rize RTs by random variables, and hence in form of probability distributions.
Such distributions are determined experimentally by sampling RTs in long
trial sequences. One aspect of this standard procedure is that RTs are sub-
ject to different sources of variability, including but not limited to attentional
fluctuations (an example of inter-trial variability) and noise in neuronal pro-
cessing (an example of intra-trial variability). In the end, several sources have
contributed to the overall RT variability, which is important to keep in mind
regarding the new approach to the RSE.
To understand the RSE using the new approach, first, we need to know if
it is realistic to assume that RTs are statistically independent. As a quick and
easy answer, it is not. The issue was stressed already by Miller (1982, p. 252),
who noted that “there is a consistent negative correlation [emphasis added]
between detections of signals on different channels”. To make the issue more
tangible, how can such a negative correlation be understood and how does it
arise? At least one issue is that RTs are subject to history effects, which refer to
the many findings showing that RTs can depend on what was tested on previ-
ous trials, for example, due to task/modality switches or priming effects (e.g.,
Monsell, 2003; Spence et al., 2001; Waszak et al., 2003). To test the RSE, it is
good practice to present the paradigm’s three conditions randomly interleaved
(Gondan and Minakata, 2016). This procedure implies that the recent trial his-
tory is constantly changing (Fig. 4). For example, on one trial, signal x may be
presented following a signal y trial, which defines a switch. On another trial,
signal x may be presented after a signal x trial, which defines a repetition. In
accordance with research on history effects, it is typically found that repetition
RTs are faster than switch RTs (e.g., Gondan et al., 2004; Miller, 1982; Otto
Figure 4. The first unknown: Are RTs statistically independent? It is good practice to test the
RSE with the paradigm’s three conditions in a random trial sequence. For example, it follows
that signal x is sometimes presented after a switch from signal y. On other trials, the presenta-
tion of signal x is repeated. As trial history contributes to RTs, statistical independence cannot
be assumed.
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and Mamassian, 2012). Notably, the effect varies depending on procedures
and seems larger in bi- compared to unimodal RSE experiments (e.g., Miller,
1982, his Table 4). What implication do history effects have for the analysis
of the RSE? If switch and repetition trials are jointly used to determine RT
distributions, it is critical to understand that history effects, as an instance of
inter-trial variability, contribute to the overall RT variability. Moreover, as his-
tory effects to signals x and y are opposite in sign (i.e., expecting x is the
same thing as not expecting y), a negative correlation can arise between the
random variables that describe the experimentally determined RTs in the sin-
gle signal conditions (Otto and Mamassian, 2012). As potential correlations
have a major impact on race model predictions (Colonius, 1990; Otto and Ma-
massian, 2012, their Fig. S1A), it is clear that history effects, which lead to a
negative correlation, can strongly influence the size of the RSE. For example,
the size of the RSE is reduced if this type of history effects are avoided by us-
ing a block design instead a random trial order (Otto and Mamassian, 2012).
However, as we only start to investigate these issues, a more detailed knowl-
edge of history effects as a source of variability is needed to advance research
on the RSE. For future RSE studies, it should therefore become a standard to
study potential correlations and to report at least the size of history effects for
each data set. Likewise, any analysis or modelling approach that does not con-
sider history effects and potential correlations should be considered at least
incomplete.
To understand the RSE using the new approach, second, we need to know
if it is realistic to assume context invariance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
test the assumption directly, which was noted already by Luce (1986, p. 131,
“[context invariance] is not obviously true, and it is difficult to know how to
verify it”). Anyway, as we approach the RSE with the working hypothesis that
the basic architecture of race models is correct, we assume that the context
invariance assumption is wrong. Then, several scenarios are possible (Fig. 5).
For example, within the decision process, it can be assumed that processing
of signal x is changed by signal y as it may provide additional sensory evi-
dence via excitation (Fig. 5, y1). Consequently, if signal y is present, evidence
is accumulated faster, which will lead to a speed-up of decision times (at this
point, we should note that pooling may be considered an extreme version of
an excitatory interaction). As an alternative, it can be assumed that process-
ing of signal x is changed by signal y as it may be a source of noise in the
decision process (Fig. 5, y2). Consequently, if signal y is present, noise is
increased during evidence accumulation, which will lead to an increased vari-
ability of decision times. It is critical to understand that these two scenarios
do not provide an exhaustive set as there are many potential scenarios. The
context invariance assumption may be violated not only within the decision
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Figure 5. The second unknown: Is context invariance true? Context invariance assumes that
processing of signal x is not changed whether or not signal y is presented as well. Violations of
the assumption may occur at different stages. Within the decision making process, for example,
signal y may change the processing of signal x by inhibition/excitation (situation y1) or in
terms of noise (situation y2). Interactions may occur at any other stage including stages after a
decision is made (situation y3).
process but in principle at any other level (Fig. 5, y3). In addition, the illus-
trated interactions are reciprocal in that signal x may also change processing
of signal y. What this list shows is that there are many hypothetical scenar-
ios how context invariance may be violated and pooling of sensory evidence
within one decision unit is only one extreme of these. To advance research
on the RSE, the question is how and on what level is context invariance vio-
lated?
Our new approach helps to answer this question. The basic idea is that equa-
tion (2) can be fitted to the CDF in the redundant signals condition and that
differences between data and model can reveal potential interactions (Otto and
Mamassian, 2012). To highlight the advantage of this approach, it is interest-
ing to note that the typical reading of the race model test is that processing
in the redundant signals condition is ‘faster’ (Miller, 2016, p. 518) or ‘more
efficient’ (Townsend and Nozawa, 1997, p. 597) than predicted by pure sta-
tistical facilitation. However, the test is basically limited to the fast tail of the
RT distribution (Diederich and Colonius, 2004). The test does not consider the
slow tail, which is typically not violating the race model inequality. Given the
limitation of the test to only a subset of the responses, it is in fact very diffi-
cult to make inferences about how or in what direction context invariance is
violated. In stark contrast, a major advantage of our approach is that it consid-
ers the entire RT distribution. Hence, a much more detailed view on potential
violations of the context invariance assumption is possible.
To implement the approach, we built a simple race model following the
ideas championed by Raab (1962). We used two parallel decision units
that were originally developed to study unisensory decisions (Carpenter and
Williams, 1995; Noorani and Carpenter, 2016). These units can be fitted in
the single signal conditions. Then, to account for the redundant signals con-
dition, the two units are coupled by a logic OR gate in agreement with the
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task demands (Fig. 1). Consequently, a response to redundant signals is trig-
gered by the faster of the two units (which is the basic idea of race models;
see Fig. 2A). We extended Raab’s (1962) basic model by including a potential
correlation as a free model parameter (the correlation parameter corresponds
to the first unknown in equation (2) and is needed to compute the joint prob-
ability). In summary, the model is constrained by the single signal conditions
and has only one additional free parameter. We found that the model fitted the
RT distribution in the redundant signals condition best by assuming a strong
negative correlation, which is in agreement with the finding of a strong his-
tory effect in the data. Notably, the most prominent difference between the
model fit and the empirical data was that RTs in the redundant signals condi-
tion were more variable compared to the best model fit (Otto and Mamassian,
2012, their Fig. 3F). Hence, to understand potential violations of the context
invariance assumption (the second unknown in equation (2)), the question is
not what could lead to faster or more efficient processing but what could lead
to more variable processing. To account for this difference, we added a sec-
ond free model parameter that controls not the mean but the variability of
decision times in the parallel decision units in the redundant compared to the
single signal conditions. It is critical to understand that the additional parame-
ter does not change the basic race model architecture but manifests a specific
violation of the context invariance assumption (equation (5)). Interestingly,
this context variant race model (see Note 4) readily predicts violation of the
race model inequality very similar to empirical data (Otto and Mamassian,
2012, their Fig. S1B). Moreover, the model with only two free parameters fit-
ted the entire RT distribution in the redundant signals condition reasonably
well.
The two model parameters not only allow us to fit the empirical data but
can also provide meaning. We have discussed already the link between the
correlation parameter and history effects in random trial sequences (Fig. 4).
A prediction here is that a strong negative correlation is needed in the model
when experimental procedures lead to relatively strong history effects. Con-
sequently, as history effects seem to be smaller in uni- compared to bimodal
RSE experiments (e.g., Miller, 1982, his Table 4), the model should explain
unimodal RSE experiments assuming a relatively weak negative correlation.
The second parameter points to more variable processing in the redundant
compared to the single signal conditions. Although there are probably several
explanations for increased variability, we have speculated that one solution
may be provided by the main factor that explains RT variability in decision
making models, which is noise (Fig. 5, y2). This noise hypothesis could be
linked to recent electrophysiological findings showing that the activity of some
neurons in early sensory cortices is changed by signals in the non-preferred
modality (Lemus et al., 2010). As the changed activity is unspecific regarding
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features of the signals, this change could point to a noise interaction. However,
based on our behavioral data, we can only speculate about potential sources of
increased variability and additional research is needed to reveal more details.
Still, as a main message, each of the two model parameters points to a source
of variability that needs to be understood, which we argue is the key to finally
understand the RSE.
5. Testability and Explanatory Power
Our new approach has demonstrated that the RSE can be explained by a race
model even if the race model inequality is violated (Otto and Mamassian,
2010, 2012). The important new feature is that our race model allows for
increased variability, which is a specific violation of the context invariance
assumption (equation (5)). Miller (2016, p. 519) criticized context variant race
models, including the approach discussed above, because the “class of context
[variant] race models is sufficiently open-ended that it can never be falsified,
just like the wider class of coactivation models”. What does this mean? This
fundamental and important criticism should be alarming for any researcher ar-
guing for coactivation (pooling). The issue is that if a model is not testable, at
least in principle, it cannot be significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis
or theory as it lacks empirical import (Hempel, 1966, p. 30). Without going
as far as Miller (2016) who argues that coactivation (pooling) models are not
testable in principle, we agree that up to now there has been no significant
attempt to derive testable predictions based on coactivation (pooling). For ex-
ample, does coactivation (pooling) allow for predictions on the level of RT
distributions? Consequently, we agree that coactivation (pooling) is at present
only a very weak hypothesis to account for the RSE (not to mention the con-
ceptual confusion around the terms in the past).
The question is whether or not Miller’s (2016) fundamental critique applies
also to race models. We can certainly understand the motivation to criticize
context variant race models like ours as we stress that such models cannot
be falsified by the race model test (see Section 3, Testing Race Models; Otto
and Mamassian, 2010). However, does the limitation of a specific test mean
that race models are not testable at all? We do not think so. We have already
shown that race models provide strict rules, which we even called principles
of multisensory behavior, that predict the size of the RSE based on the RTs in
the single signal conditions (Otto et al., 2013). First, the principle of congruent
effectiveness states that the RSE is larger when median RTs in the two single
signal conditions are more similar. Second, the variability rule states that the
RSE is larger when the RTs in the single signal conditions are more variable
(which is closely related to our claim that understanding sources of variability
is the key to understand the RSE). The two principles can of course be tested,
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and with that race models that explain the RSE by statistical facilitation. For
example, a very typical manipulation in RSE experiments is to change the
relative onset of signals (e.g., Hershenson, 1962; Miller, 1986; Otto et al.,
2013). This manipulation puts race models to test because the principle of
congruent effectiveness predicts that the RSE is largest when the two signals
trigger responses at the same time. Whatever signals are tested, it follows that
the RSE should be largest when the onset of the signal with faster RTs is
delayed by the RT difference between the single signal conditions. As this
prediction is confirmed in experiments, studies that changed the relative onset
of signals have in fact provided evidential support for statistical facilitation
and, hence, for race models (Otto et al., 2013). Another typical manipulation
is to change the intensity of signals (e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2011; Otto et
al., 2013; Senkowski et al., 2011). As changing the intensity of signals affects
both the average and the spread of RTs, both principles are put to test. The
principle of equal effectiveness is tested, as it predicts that the RSE is largest
if signal intensities are calibrated to trigger responses at the same time. The
variability rule is tested as it predicts that the RSE is increasing as the RT
variability increases, which is the case for weaker signal intensities. As the
predictions are confirmed in experiments, studies that changed the intensity of
signals have in fact also provided evidential support for statistical facilitation
and, hence, for race models (Otto et al., 2013). Consequently, Miller’s (2016)
fundamental criticism does not apply to race models as these can be and have
been tested. The only unfortunate issue is that the standing of race models has
suffered in the past from the repeated misinterpretation of the race model test.
To advance research on the RSE, we hope it will be finally recognized that
there is in fact strong evidential support for race models across a broad range
of signals, conditions, and participants.
We are very optimistic that race models can provide a universal account
for the fascinating diversity of RSE studies, but there is even more as un-
derstanding race models can help to bridge the gap to other experimental
tasks and paradigms. The analysis of the task demands shows that the re-
dundant signals paradigm requires a logical disjunction (Fig. 1). Race mod-
els perfectly meet this requirement by assuming parallel decision units that
are coupled by a logic OR gate (Fig. 2A). Now, what if the task demands
change? Is it possible to adapt the framework to meet the task demands in other
paradigms? For example, the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm
presents two signals as well but asks participants to respond to each signal
with a different motor response (e.g., Pashler, 1994; Sigman and Dehaene,
2005; Welford, 1952). Given these task demands, a pooling of sensory evi-
dence seems to make no sense here. In contrast, it has been recently argued
that the PRP is also well understood in that sensory evidence for the two
signals is accumulated by parallel decision units (Zylberberg et al., 2012).
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The PRP and the redundant signals paradigm could therefore be analyzed
jointly with a focus on the cognitive structures that route perceptual deci-
sions to motor outputs. This approach can be further refined by not only
presenting identical signals but by also keeping the motor response identi-
cal. In this case, only the cognitive structures that route perceptual decisions
to motor outputs would be put to test. This approach can be implemented
for example in a new experiment, which changes the task demands of the
redundant signals paradigm in that the single signal conditions no longer re-
quire responses. A systematic analysis of the task demands shows that the
two signals are, by design of the paradigm, coupled by a logical conjunc-
tion (Fig. 6A). Given the new task demands, a pooling of sensory evidence
seems to make no sense here either. In contrast, the basic cognitive architec-
ture of race models can be effortlessly adapted to meet the new task demands.
In the model, only the logic OR needs to be replaced by a logic AND gate
(Fig. 6B). We tested the adapted model and found that it predicted the slow-
down of RTs in the new conjunction task surprisingly well (Otto and Ma-
massian, 2012, their Fig. 4). Consequently, the basic ideas championed by
Raab (1962) can actually be understood as part of a much larger framework,
which assumes that parallel decision units are flexibly coupled by cognitive
functions according to the task demands. This larger framework demonstrates
a convincing explanatory power within and beyond the redundant signals
paradigm, which makes it potentially extremely useful for multisensory re-
search.
Figure 6. Explanatory power. (A) Analysis of the task demands in a new experiment. To test the
hypothesis that parallel decisions are flexibly coupled by logic gates, a new task uses identical
signals and the same motor response as in the redundant signals paradigm (Fig. 1). The only
difference is that the new task does not ask for responses in the single signal conditions (middle
rows). The resulting truth table is the truth table of a logical conjunction (AND). (B) Model
prediction. To account for the new task demands, the basic race model architecture (Fig. 2A)
can be easily adapted by replacing the logic OR by a logic AND gate. The adapted model
predicts RTs in the new experiment surprisingly well (Otto and Mamassian, 2012).
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6. Conclusion
The redundant signals paradigm is a classic paradigm in multisensory research
and the RSE is one of the most prominent behavioral benefits with multisen-
sory signals. Given the huge number and fascinating diversity of experimental
studies, it should be a main objective for multisensory research to under-
stand whether or not a common cognitive function contributes to the RSE.
We here discussed our new approach to the RSE, which is in stark contrast to
the mainstream of the last decades (see the many follow-up studies of Miller,
1982). As a major change of direction, our working hypothesis is that the ba-
sic race model architecture championed by Raab (1962) is correct even if the
race model test has been interpreted to suggest otherwise. We argue that our
new approach allows to precisely predict the RSE and to reveal and quantify
specific interactions in the processing of multisensory signals (Otto and Ma-
massian, 2012; Otto et al., 2013). What is more, the approach points directly
to a set of basic cognitive functions, which we summarize as a flexible logic
coupling of parallel decisions according to the task demands. In the end, we
think that this set of functions is fundamental to the combinatorial benefit of
multisensory signals.
Finally, we like to reiterate that Miller’s (1982) race model test is a beau-
tiful example of hypothesis testing in scientific enquiry. The test shows that
Raab’s (1962) basic race model alone, even when a correlation parameter is
added, cannot explain the RSE. Hence, we would say that ‘something inter-
esting’ happens. To our opinion, RSE research should not stop at this point
but try to find an explanation (which, as we have shown, can still involve the
basic race model architecture). This endeavor calls of course for the contin-
ued use of the race model test. However, what became evident throughout
is that RSE research has suffered in the past from methodological inconsis-
tencies and conceptual confusion (Gondan and Minakata, 2016; Miller, 2016;
Otto and Mamassian, 2010). We hope that the four main items, which we have
discussed here, help to resolve at least some of the confusion. Based on the
discussed material, we provide a checklist for RSE studies (Table 1). This min-
imum set of questions hopefully helps to further improve research consistency,
which we think is critically needed to finally understand the RSE.
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Table 1.
Checklist for RSE studies
◦ Are terms and concepts clearly defined?
◦ Is the race model test correctly used (inequality (6))?
◦ Is context invariance discussed (equation (5))?
◦ Are history effects quantified and reported (Fig. 4)?
◦ Are history effects considered by a proposed model?
◦ Is a proposed model well-specified and testable?
Notes
1. The cited studies present only a small subset of research on the RSE as an
extensive review is beyond the scope of this opinion paper (for a methods
review on 181 recent studies, see Gondan and Minakata, 2016).
2. We focus on two solutions that were considered most frequently in re-
search on the RSE. Townsend and Nozawa (1997) discuss also an alterna-
tive serial processing architecture.
3. If the race model inequality is not violated (confirming the consequent),
nothing can be concluded. The hypothesis may be true or false.
4. Gondan and Minakata (2016, p. 731) classify our model as a ‘coactivation
model’, which we think can be misleading given the frequent confusion of
coactivation and pooling (Fig. 2B). The term context variant race model
is much more consistent as the basic model architecture fits our definition
of race models (Fig. 2A). The add-on context variant indicates that the
context invariance assumption is violated. The class of context variant race
models includes for example also the ‘interactive race model’ proposed by
Mordkoff and Yantis (1991).
References
Ashby, F. G. and Townsend, J. T. (1986). Varieties of perceptual independence, Psychol. Rev.
93, 154–179.
Blurton, S. P., Greenlee, M. W. and Gondan, M. (2014). Multisensory processing of redundant
information in go/no-go and choice responses, Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 76, 1212–1233.
Bogacz, R. (2007). Optimal decision-making theories: linking neurobiology with behaviour,
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 118–125.
Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P. and Cohen, J. D. (2006). The physics of optimal
decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-
choice tasks, Psychol. Rev. 113, 700–765.
Bogacz, R., Wagenmakers, E. J., Forstmann, B. U. and Nieuwenhuis, S. (2010). The neural
basis of the speed-accuracy tradeoff, Trends Neurosci. 33, 10–16.
Multisensory Research (2016) DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002541 21
Brandwein, A. B., Foxe, J. J., Butler, J. S., Russo, N. N., Altschuler, T. S., Gomes, H. and Mol-
holm, S. (2013). The development of multisensory integration in high-functioning autism:
high-density electrical mapping and psychophysical measures reveal impairments in the pro-
cessing of audiovisual inputs, Cereb. Cortex 23, 1329–1341.
Brang, D., Williams, L. E. and Ramachandran, V. S. (2012). Grapheme-color synesthetes show
enhanced crossmodal processing between auditory and visual modalities, Cortex 48, 630–
637.
Carpenter, R. H. S. and Williams, M. L. (1995). Neural computation of log likelihood in control
of saccadic eye movements, Nature 377(6544), 59–62.
Chandrasekaran, C., Lemus, L., Trubanova, A., Gondan, M. and Ghazanfar, A. A. (2011). Mon-
keys and humans share a common computation for face/voice integration, PLoS Comput.
Biol. 7, e1002165. DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002165.
Collignon, O., Girard, S., Gosselin, F., Saint-Amour, D., Lepore, F. and Lassonde, M. (2010).
Women process multisensory emotion expressions more efficiently than men, Neuropsy-
chologia 48, 220–225.
Colonius, H. (1990). Possibly dependent probability summation of reaction-time, J. Math. Psy-
chol. 34, 253–275.
Colonius, H. and Diederich, A. (2006). The race model inequality: interpreting a geometric
measure of the amount of violation, Psychol. Rev. 113, 148–154.
Corballis, M. C. (1998). Interhemispheric neural summation in the absence of the corpus callo-
sum, Brain 121, 1795–1807.
Deco, G. and Rolls, E. T. (2006). Decision-making and Weber’s law: a neurophysiological
model, Eur. J. Neurosci. 24, 901–916.
Diederich, A. and Colonius, H. (2004). Modeling the time course of multisensory interaction
in manual and saccadic responses, in: Handbook of Multisensory Processes, G. Calvert,
C. Spence and B. E. Stein (Eds), pp. 395–408. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Driver, J. and Noesselt, T. (2008). Multisensory interplay reveals crossmodal influences on
‘sensory-specific’ brain regions, neural responses, and judgments, Neuron 57, 11–23.
Feintuch, U. and Cohen, A. (2002). Visual attention and coactivation of response decisions for
features from different dimensions, Psychol. Sci. 13, 361–369.
Ghazanfar, A. A. and Schroeder, C. E. (2006). Is neocortex essentially multisensory? Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 278–285.
Giard, M. H. and Peronnet, F. (1999). Auditory-visual integration during multimodal object
recognition in humans: a behavioral and electrophysiological study, J. Cogn. Neurosci. 11,
473–490.
Girard, S., Pelland, M., Lepore, F. and Collignon, O. (2013). Impact of the spatial congruence
of redundant targets on within-modal and cross-modal integration, Exp. Brain Res. 224,
275–285.
Gold, J. I. and Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making, Annu. Rev. Neurosci.
30, 535–574.
Gondan, M. and Minakata, K. (2016). A tutorial on testing the race model inequality, Atten.
Percept. Psychophys. 78, 723–735.
Gondan, M., Lange, K., Rosler, F. and Roder, B. (2004). The redundant target effect is affected
by modality switch costs, Psychonom. Bull. Rev. 11, 307–313.
Hanes, D. P. and Schall, J. D. (1996). Neural control of voluntary movement initiation, Science
274(5286), 427–430.
22 T. U. Otto, P. Mamassian / Multisensory Research (2016)
Hanks, T. D., Kopec, C. D., Brunton, B. W., Duan, C. A., Erlich, J. C. and Brody, C. D. (2015).
Distinct relationships of parietal and prefrontal cortices to evidence accumulation, Nature
520(7546), 220–223.
Harrar, V., Tammam, J., Perez-Bellido, A., Pitt, A., Stein, J. and Spence, C. (2014). Multisensory
integration and attention in developmental dyslexia, Curr. Biol. 24, 531–535.
Hecht, D., Reiner, M. and Karni, A. (2008). Enhancement of response times to bi- and tri-modal
sensory stimuli during active movements, Exp. Brain Res. 185, 655–665.
Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S. and Ungerleider, L. G. (2008). The neural systems that mediate
human perceptual decision making, Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 467–479.
Hempel, C. (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ,
USA.
Hershenson, M. (1962). Reaction time as a measure of intersensory facilitation, J. Exp. Psychol.
63, 289–293.
Hughes, H. C., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., Nozawa, G. and Fendrich, R. (1994). Visual-auditory
interactions in sensorimotor processing: saccades versus manual responses, J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 20, 131–153.
Katzner, S., Busse, L. and Treue, S. (2006). Feature-based attentional integration of color and
visual motion, J. Vis. 6, 269–284.
Kinchla, R. A. (1974). Detecting target elements in multielement arrays: a confusability model,
Percept. Psychophys. 15, 149–158.
Koene, A. R. and Zhaoping, L. (2007). Feature-specific interactions in salience from combined
feature contrasts: evidence for a bottom-up saliency map in V1, J. Vis. 7(6), 1–14.
Krummenacher, J., Grubert, A., Töllner, T. and Müller, H. J. (2014). Salience-based integration
of redundant signals in visual pop-out search: evidence from behavioral and electrophysio-
logical measures, J. Vis. 14, 26. DOI:10.1167/14.3.26.
Lemus, L., Hernández, A., Luna, R., Zainos, A. and Romo, R. (2010). Do sensory cortices
process more than one sensory modality during perceptual judgments? Neuron 67, 335–
348.
Luce, R. D. (1986). Response Times: Their Role in Inferring Elementary Mental Organization.
Oxford University Press, New York, NY, USA.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: a Computational Investigation Into the Human Representation and
Processing of Visual Information. Henry Holt and Co, New York, NY, USA.
Martuzzi, R., Murray, M. M., Michel, C. M., Thiran, J. P., Maeder, P. P., Clarke, S. and Meuli,
R. A. (2007). Multisensory interactions within human primary cortices revealed by BOLD
dynamics, Cereb. Cortex 17, 1672–1679.
Miller, J. (1982). Divided attention: evidence for coactivation with redundant signals, Cogn.
Psychol. 14, 247–279.
Miller, J. (1986). Timecourse of coactivation in bimodal divided attention, Percept. Psychophys.
40, 331–343.
Miller, J. (2016). Statistical facilitation and the redundant signals effect: what are race and
coactivation models?, Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 78, 516–519.
Molholm, S., Ritter, W., Murray, M. M., Javitt, D. C., Schroeder, C. E. and Foxe, J. J. (2002).
Multisensory auditory-visual interactions during early sensory processing in humans: a high-
density electrical mapping study, Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 14, 115–128.
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching, Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 134–140.
Multisensory Research (2016) DOI:10.1163/22134808-00002541 23
Mordkoff, J. T. and Yantis, S. (1991). An interactive race model of divided attention, J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 17, 520–538.
Mordkoff, J. T. and Yantis, S. (1993). Dividing attention between color and shape — evidence
of coactivation, Percept. Psychophys. 53, 357–366.
Murray, M. M., Molholm, S., Michel, C. M., Heslenfeld, D. J., Ritter, W., Javitt, D. C.,
Schroeder, C. E. and Foxe, J. J. (2005). Grabbing your ear: rapid auditory-somatosensory
multisensory interactions in low-level sensory cortices are not constrained by stimulus align-
ment, Cereb. Cortex 15, 963–974.
Noorani, I. and Carpenter, R. H. (2016). The LATER model of reaction time and decision,
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 64, 229–251.
Otto, T. U. and Mamassian, P. (2010). Noise vs. Multisensory Integration: the Return of the Race
Model, paper presented at the 11th International Multisensory Research Forum (IMRF),
Liverpool, UK.
Otto, T. U. and Mamassian, P. (2012). Noise and correlations in parallel perceptual decision
making, Curr. Biol. 22, 1391–1396.
Otto, T. U., Dassy, B. and Mamassian, P. (2013). Principles of multisensory behavior, J. Neu-
rosci. 33, 7463–7474.
Pashler, H. (1994). Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory, Psychol. Bull. 116,
220–244.
Perez-Bellido, A., Soto-Faraco, S. and Lopez-Moliner, J. (2013). Sound-driven enhancement
of vision: disentangling detection-level from decision-level contributions, J. Neurophysiol.
109, 1065–1077.
Poom, L. (2009). Integration of colour, motion, orientation, and spatial frequency in visual
search, Perception 38, 708–718.
Raab, D. H. (1962). Statistical facilitation of simple reaction times, Trans. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 24,
574–590.
Ratcliff, R. (1978). Theory of memory retrieval, Psychol. Rev. 85, 59–108.
Reddi, B. A. J., Asrress, K. N. and Carpenter, R. H. S. (2003). Accuracy, information, and
response time in a saccadic decision task, J. Neurophysiol. 90, 3538–3546.
Schröter, H., Frei, L. S., Ulrich, R. and Miller, J. (2009). The auditory redundant signals effect:
an influence of number of stimuli or number of percepts?, Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 71,
1375–1384.
Senkowski, D., Saint-Amour, D., Hofle, M. and Foxe, J. J. (2011). Multisensory interactions
in early evoked brain activity follow the principle of inverse effectiveness, Neuroimage 56,
2200–2208.
Shadlen, M. N. and Newsome, W. T. (2001). Neural basis of a perceptual decision in the parietal
cortex (area LIP) of the rhesus monkey, J. Neurophysiol. 86, 1916–1936.
Sigman, M. and Dehaene, S. (2005). Parsing a cognitive task: a characterization of the mind’s
bottleneck, PLoS Biol. 3, 334–349.
Spence, C., Nicholls, M. E. R. and Driver, J. (2001). The cost of expecting events in the wrong
sensory modality, Percept. Psychophys. 63, 330–336.
Stein, B. E. and Stanford, T. R. (2008). Multisensory integration: current issues from the per-
spective of the single neuron, Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 255–266.
Stein, B. E., Burr, D., Constantinidis, C., Laurienti, P. J., Meredith, M. A., Perrault, T. J.,
Ramachandran, R., Roder, B., Rowland, B. A., Sathian, K., Schroeder, C. E., Shams, L.,
24 T. U. Otto, P. Mamassian / Multisensory Research (2016)
Stanford, T. R., Wallace, M. T., Yu, L. P. and Lewkowicz, D. J. (2010). Semantic confusion
regarding the development of multisensory integration: a practical solution, Eur. J. Neurosci.
31, 1713–1720.
Todd, J. (1912). Reaction to multiple stimuli, Arch. Psychol. 3, 1–65.
Townsend, J. T. and Nozawa, G. (1997). Serial exhaustive models can violate the race model
inequality: implications for architecture and capacity, Psychol. Rev. 104, 595–602.
Townsend, J. T. and Wenger, M. J. (2004). A theory of interactive parallel processing: new
capacity measures and predictions for a response time inequality series, Psychol. Rev. 111,
1003–1035.
Ulrich, R., Miller, J. and Schröter, H. (2007). Testing the race model inequality: an algorithm
and computer programs, Behav. Res. Meth. 39, 291–302.
Wald, A. and Wolfowitz, J. (1948). Optimum character of the sequential probability ratio test,
Ann. Math. Stat. 19, 326–339.
Wang, X. J. (2002). Probabilistic decision making by slow reverberation in cortical circuits,
Neuron 36, 955–968.
Waszak, F., Hommel, B. and Allport, A. (2003). Task-switching and long-term priming: role of
episodic stimulus — task bindings in task-shift costs, Cogn. Psychol. 46, 361–413.
Welford, A. T. (1952). The ‘Psychological Refractory Period’ and the timing of high-speed
performance — a review and a theory, Br. J. Psychol. Gen. Sect. 43, 2–19.
Wuerger, S. M., Crocker-Buque, A. and Meyer, G. F. (2012). Evidence for auditory-visual pro-
cessing specific to biological motion, Seeing Perceiving 25, 15–28.
Zylberberg, A., Ouellette, B., Sigman, M. and Roelfsema, P. R. (2012). Decision making during
the psychological refractory period, Curr. Biol. 22, 1795–1799.
